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We investigate a three-person coalition game in which one bargainer, the builder, 
can propose and build a coalition over two stages. In equilibrium, coalition 
building ends with an efficient grand coalition, while the equilibrium path is 
contingent on the values of the two-person coalitions and associated externality 
payoffs. Considering relative payoffs need not change the equilibrium path. 
Nevertheless, outcomes in the experiment are often inefficient. One explanation is 
that bargainers have difficulties anticipating the future actions of other bargainers. 
This problem might be mitigated by allowing bargainers to communicate prior to 
each stage. A test finds that communication does in fact increase efficiency, 
although unevenly, and at the cost of the builder. The study implies that the nature 
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1  Introduction 
What is involved in building a coalition? In this paper, we study behavior in a three-
person extensive form game in which coalitions can be endogenously renegotiated. The 
formation of a coalition imposes commonly known externalities on non-members. The game 
allows one bargainer, the coalition “builder”, to shape the process of negotiation by choosing to 
negotiate with both of the other bargainers together or one after another. The game has a unique 
equilibrium that is sensitive to the size of the externalities, but always leads to the efficient grand 
coalition. The driving elements that shape coalition building in this game - renegotiation and 
externalities - are commonly observed features of many actual coalition building problems; Lax 
and Sebenius (1991) discuss a number of examples including intra-organizational negotiations, 
mergers and acquisitions, and international trade treaties.  
There is a long, if fragmented, history of behavioral study of coalition building. 
Coalitions have been central to the theory of games since the subject’s inception. In the first 
chapter of their famous book, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, p. 15) state that, “Our 
subsequent discussion of “games of strategy” will show that the role and size of “coalitions” is 
decisive throughout the entire subject.” Early behavioral work was guided by cooperative game 
theory which at the time provided the most highly developed models of coalition formation. 
Selten (1987) reviews the early experimental literature and finds none of the (cooperative) 
theories “completely satisfactory in light of the data.”  
One of the limitations of cooperative models is that, by their nature, they provide little 
guidance for studying the process of coalition formation. It seems likely that this process has 
important explanatory power: On the one hand, making some commitments early on allows the 
builder to credibly tie his hands in a way that can be advantageous in later negotiations (i.e., 
Schelling, 1960); indeed the theory of the influence of externalities we benchmark with here 
picks up on this. On the other hand, the early commitments entail strategic risk in that the builder 
constrains his ability to satisfy interests in ways that might derail later agreements. Hence the 
process of coalition building may have implications both for the efficiency of the negotiation as 
well as for individual allocations.  
  There have been a number of recent advances in the non-cooperative modeling of 
coalition building. The game we study here borrows much of its architecture from a model by 
Gomes (2005). He develops an infinite horizon coalition bargaining model of sequential offers   2
and counteroffers, incorporating both externalities and renegotiation. We simplify the process to 
a finite horizon game in much the same spirit that Rubinstein’s (1982) bilateral sequential 
bargaining game was simplified to a finite horizon for the purpose of behavioral study.
1 
  Non-cooperative models of coalition building have sparked a new, still nascent, round of 
behavioral studies. One line in this research compares non-cooperative and cooperative model 
forecasts. These studies focus on relatively free form bargaining games, to provide a fairer 
comparison of cooperative and non-cooperative solution concepts. Bolton, Chatterjee, and 
McGuinn (2003) investigate how various communication configurations affect a three-person 
coalition negotiation with (implicit) renegotiation but no externalities. Neither the core nor the 
Shapley value show any particular fit, but the solution to an infinite horizon non-cooperative 
game implies many of the qualitative characteristics of the data. Croson, Gomes, McGinn, and 
Nöth (2004) study three-person coalition building in the context of mergers and acquisitions, 
where there are externalities and renegotiation. They conclude that the predictions of Gomes’ 
infinite horizon model are a better approximation to what they observe than are cooperative 
game solution concepts such as the nucleolus and the Shapley value.
2  
  While these studies are indicative of the promise of non-cooperative models, the evidence 
is indirect in the sense that the free form game experiments introduce a number of factors that are 
extraneous to the non-cooperative models but potentially important to the actions actually 
observed. For example, they introduce relatively free communication between bargainers, the 
influence of which will be investigated here. Moreover, it is difficult to tease the influence of 
these factors apart without greater control over the action space. A second, still nascent, line of 
laboratory research looks directly at non-cooperative game forms. Frechette, Kagel, and Morelli 
(2005) study winning coalition formation under majority rule in Baron-Ferejohn as well as 
demand models of political coalition building. They find that neither model fits the data 
particularly well. Notably, they show the data is consistent with field data on parliamentary 
voting - data taken from essentially free form bargaining, and previously interpreted as being 
consistent with the non-cooperative models. Okada and Riedl (2005) investigate a three-person 
                                                 
1 Other theoretical work on non-cooperative coalition models considers renegotiation or externalities, but not both; 
see Gomes (2005) for an overview of this literature. 
2 See also McGinn, Milkman, and Nöth (2007) who investigate the free form communication patterns obtained in 
Croson, Gomes, McGinn, and Nöth (2004) in more detail.   3
ultimatum game, and characterize the role that reciprocal fairness plays. The coalition games in 
these studies do not include renegotiation or externalities, the issues that are our focus here. 
  We can anticipate that one obstacle to building a grand coalition – a factor not considered 
by the benchmark model – will be the (privately known) preferences individual bargainers have 
for relative payoffs. In fact, demands for relative payoffs are a known cause of the inefficient 
outcomes observed in non-cooperative, bilateral sequential bargaining games (Güth, 
Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982; Ochs and Roth, 1989; and De Bruyn and Bolton, 2006). In 
anticipation of this, our experiment includes a treatment in which relative and absolute payoffs 
are aligned such that the renegotiation path proscribed by relative payoff theories, and that 
proscribed by absolute-payoff-only theory are the same, and have just slightly different payoff 
allocations. The builder in this game gains virtually nothing from knowing how the other 
bargainers he or she faces trade-off absolute and relative payoffs; the optimal action, and one that 
leads to the successful building of a grand coalition, is essentially independent of this 
information, and is essentially the same as what results from considering absolute payoffs only.  
  Nevertheless, the data shows a rather large amount of inefficiency, even in the treatment 
where relative payoffs are controlled as described. A close analysis of the data suggests that, 
while relative payoffs are clearly responsible for much of the disagreement we see, bargainers 
gauge their relative payoff more myopically than either observations from bilateral bargaining 
games of similar length, or standard theories of relative payoffs, would suggest.  
  While these games are no longer than the two-round bilateral bargaining games where 
standard relative payoff theory is known to work well, they are nevertheless more complex in 
that there are more second stage scenarios, as well as more bargainers, to be taken account of. A 
natural hypothesis is that this greater complexity makes it more difficult for bargainers to 
anticipate the second round actions of others. If so, it seems likely that allowing nonbinding 
communication between bargainers might reduce inefficiency and lead to a higher rate of 
successful coalition building. An extension of our design to allow nonbinding communication 
among bargainers prior to play of each round of the game supports the claim. It appears that 
communication is a critical factor in the amount of efficiency observed in these games.    
     4
2  The new experiment 
2.1  The coalition game 
  The three bargainers in the game are A, B, and C, where A is “the builder”. Each possible 
coalition results in a certain earning for the coalition as a whole, as well as a certain earning for 
any player who is not in the coalition (we will get to specific values in a moment). The game 
begins in the No Coalition condition. The negotiation then proceeds in two stages: In stage 1, A 
proposes a coalition and a split of the coalition’s earnings among the coalition members. 
Proposed-to members are then simultaneously asked to either accept or reject the proposal. If all 
accept, then the coalition forms and the accepting members exit the negotiation with the earnings 
they accepted. If any rejects, then there is No Coalition. If the grand coalition, ABC, forms, then 
the game ends with the implied payoffs. Otherwise, the game proceeds to stage 2, where A either 
proposes to enlarge the coalition that formed in Stage 1 or keeps it as is. To enlarge the coalition, 
A proposes a split of the earnings between himself and the new members. The earnings of a 
member who already formed a coalition with A in stage 1 cannot be changed. Each newly 
proposed-to member is asked to either accept or reject the proposal. If all accept, then the 
coalition forms and all players exit the game with the earnings they accepted. If any rejects, then 
all players exit with the coalition and split determined by stage 1. 
Table 1.  Coalition configurations and predicted outcomes by treatment* 
(all payoffs in U.S. dollars) 
 
  All treatments    
  No coalition payoffs:  V(A) = V(B) = V(C) = 14 Grand coalition: V(ABC) = 66 
 
Coalition values 











(A, B, C) 
T1 46 38 21 17  [ABC] [ABC] (36,  15,  15) 
T2 46 38 11  7  [ABC] [AB] Æ [ABC]  (42, 16, 8) 
T3 56 38 11  7  [AB] [AC] Æ [ABC]  (46, 12, 8) 
 * V(XY) is the value of coalition [XY] and V(Z) is the externality payoff that Z receives when coalition [XY] forms. 
** Subgame perfect equilibrium. 
 
  Payoffs to two-person coalitions and associated externality payoffs vary by treatment as 
stated in Table 1. In all treatments, a No Coalition outcome pays $14 per player, while the grand 
coalition is worth a total of $66. A two-person coalition imposes an externality on the excluded   5
player in the sense that, for example, in Treatment 1, if A and B form a coalition, C’s payoff 
increases to $17 from $14 when there is no coalition. 
2.2  Equilibrium analysis (non-relative payoff version) 
  The subgame perfect equilibrium path of coalition formation, as well as the associated 
outcome, vary with the values of the two-person coalitions and associated externality payoffs. In 
this analysis, we will assume that each bargainer attempts to maximize his or her (absolute) 
pecuniary payoff from the game. Each treatment of the experiment features a game with a unique 
equilibrium coalition formation path. 
  Let’s begin with Treatment 2: To derive the equilibrium path, we first consider the threat 
coalition; that is, the coalition that should form if no coalition forms in the first stage. In such 
circumstances, the second stage is essentially an ultimatum game in which the proposer A needs 
to get both responders B and C to accept. Inspection shows that the threat coalition is the grand 
coalition with associated allocation 36-15-15, since this offers the minimum amount that makes 
B and C better off from accepting than rejecting, thus maximizing A’s payoff.
3 We then roll back 
to the first stage. A can best improve on his threat coalition payoff by proposing, in stage 1, AB 
with associated allocation 30-16, which B should accept, and then proposing ABC and 42-16-8 to 
C in stage 2, which should also be accepted (recall that, by the rules of the game, B is out of the 
game after accepting in stage 1).  
  Observe that, in equilibrium of the Treatment 2 game, A improves on his threat coalition 
payoff by sequencing the coalition building to exploit the negative externality incurred by C 
when  AB forms in the first stage. The Treatment 1 variation of the game has positive 
externalities, adding 10 to each external payoff in Treatment 2, which leaves the threat coalition 
and associated payoffs unchanged. But now the threat coalition is the best that A can hope to 
realize, and so the threat coalition is also the final coalition. The Treatment 3 variation of the 
game, relative to Treatment 2, leaves the externalities unchanged but increases the payoff value 
of AB to the point that it becomes the threat coalition. A can improve on the threat coalition 
payoff by first proposing AC with associated allocation 30-8 in stage 1, which C should accept 
                                                 
3 We assume that bargainers accept only if they make more than if they reject.   6
given his expectation of receiving 7 under the threat coalition, and then proposing ABC and 46-
12-8 to B in stage 2, which should also be accepted. 
  The above theory does not consider what role relative payoffs might play in bargainer 
behavior. We will return to discuss this analysis in section 3.2 below.   
2.3  Laboratory procedures 
  The experiment involved 159 subjects. Each of the three treatments T1, T2, and T3 was 
played in two sessions with 18 subjects each (using a between subject design). The only 
difference in the treatments was game payoffs. All other aspects of the design, and all 
procedures, were the same. Subjects played a sequence of five games. A subject’s role (A, B, or 
C) was assigned randomly at the beginning of the session and remained the same for all five 
games. No one ever negotiated with the same person more than once (publicly announced at the 
beginning of the session). Actual game matches were anonymous before, during, and after the 
experiment.  
  In addition, we ran two treatments T1_C (one session with 18 subjects) and T3_C (two 
sessions with 18 and 15 subjects, respectively) allowing bargainers to communicate prior to the 
issuing of proposals and responses.
4 Specifically, prior to each stage of the game, the three 
bargainers entered a chat-room where they could exchange messages for a period of three 
minutes. The only constraint imposed was that bargainers could not reveal their identity in their 
messages (sent messages were tagged by role of sender: A,  B, or C). We discuss the 
communication treatments in section 4. 
  The experiment was conducted at the LEMA laboratory, Smeal College of Business, 
Penn State University. The subjects were all Penn State University students, recruited via a web 
site solicitation. Cash was the only incentive offered. At the beginning of the session, subjects 
read instructions and played some practice games with the computer as partner to illustrate how 
the computer interface worked from the perspective of all three players (see the reprinted 
instructions in the Appendix for details). Upon completion of the five rounds of games, subjects 
                                                 
4 Due to technical difficulties, in one session of T3_C subjects played only a sequence of 2 games instead of the 5 
done in all other sessions.    7
were paid a show-up fee of $5 plus their earnings from one, randomly chosen game. The average 
total payout was $26, ranging from $5 to $45. Sessions lasted about 90 minutes.  
3  Results 
  We begin the analysis by reviewing the end results of the games. We then back up to 
examine each stage of play, with an aim of understanding how the results came about.  
  
Table 2.  Frequencies of final coalitions 
Treatment ABC  AB  AC  No 
Coalition 
T1  31 (52%)  20 (33%)  0 (0%)  9 (15%) 
T2  35 (58%)  17 (28%)  4 (7%)  4 (7%) 
T3  16 (27%)  37 (62%)  4 (7%)  3 (5%) 
Total  82 (46%)  74 (41%)  8 (4%)  16 (9%) 
 
3.1  The final coalitions and associated player payoffs 
  Table 2 displays the distribution of final coalitions. There are three things to observe. 
First, many of the final coalitions are inefficient; only 46% of all negotiations end with the grand 
coalition ABC. Second, most of the deviations from the grand coalition are to AB which, overall, 
is observed almost as frequently as ABC. In all treatments, AC and No Coalitions are observed at 
only very low frequencies. Third, the frequency distribution of final coalitions is about the same 
in T1 and T2, but different in T3. In T1 and T2, ABC is roughly twice as likely as AB. In T3, just 
the reverse: AB is roughly twice as likely as ABC.  
  Statistical tests on observed frequencies of final coalitions are consistent with these 
observations (χ
2-tests, n = 12 per round and treatment). Comparing T3 to the other treatments, 
pair-wise, indicates significant differences for the frequency of ABC formation (p < 0.050 for 2 
comparisons, p < 0.100 for 2 comparisons, p > 0.100 for 6 comparisons) as well as AB formation 
(p < 0.050 for 2 comparisons, p < 0.100 for 3 comparisons, p > 0.100 for 5 comparisons). 
Analogous tests between T1 and T2 show almost no significant difference (p = 0.098 for 1 
comparison, p > 0.100 for 19 comparisons). There is also almost no significant difference across 
the three treatments with regard to the frequency of AC or No Coalition outcomes (p = 0.064 for 
1 comparison, p > 0.100 for 29 comparisons).    8
Figure 1.  Actual mean payoffs versus subgame perfect equilibrium 
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  Moving to final player payoffs, Figure 1 displays the average payoffs across roles. There 
are two things to observe. First, the roles’ payoffs are more equal than theory anticipates. 
Nevertheless, and second, the differences that there are between roles largely conform to the 
ordinal differences anticipated by the theory: In all three treatments, there is a persistent first 
mover advantage. The ordinal differences across treatments for both A and C role payoffs are 
also consistent with theory. Ordinal differences in B role payoffs across treatment, however, 
deviate somewhat from theory.  
  Statistical tests on observed frequencies of final payoffs are consistent with these 
observations (n = 12 per round and treatment). Players A payoffs were lower than those predicted 
by theory, the payoffs for players B and C were higher than the predicted ones (p < 0.050 for 39 
comparisons, p < 0.100 for 4 comparisons, two-tailed one-sample t test).
5  Players A do better 
than the other roles (p < 0.050 for all 5 rounds in all three treatments, two-tailed exact Mann 
Whitney U test). Players A receive higher payoffs in T2 and T3 than in T1 (T1 vs. T3: p < 0.050 
for 3 rounds, p < 0.100 for 2 rounds, T1 vs. T2: p < 0.100 for 3 rounds). Players C receive lower 
payoffs in T3 than in T2 and lower payoffs in T2 than in T1 (T1 vs. T3: p < 0.050 for 4 rounds, 
T1 vs. T2: p < 0.050 for 2 rounds, T2 vs. T3: p < 0.100 for 1 round). Players B, however, receive 
                                                 
5 The total number of comparisons is 45 and results from multiplying the number of players (3) with the number of 
rounds (5) with the number of treatments (3).   9
the highest payoff in T3 (T1 vs. T3: p < 0.100 for 1 round, T1 vs. T2: p < 0.050 for 1 round, T2 
vs. T3: p < 0.050 for 3 rounds).  
  In sum, there are clear treatment effects within the set of observed outcomes, although 
not all of these effects are anticipated by theory. In what follows, we will focus on the major 
deviations from theory: The bias towards the inefficient AB coalition, the tendency for this bias 
to be more pronounced in Treatment 3, and the compression of payoffs towards equality.  
3.2  A brief digression on the application of relative payoff theory 
  We will see in a moment that relative payoffs are an important factor in the behavior we 
observe. However, it turns out that standard analyses of the role of relative payoffs in (bilateral) 
bargaining fall short in particular ways. Specifically, the following analysis shows that while 
preferences for relative payoffs may well compress differences in bargainer payoffs relative to 
the purely monetary equilibrium analysis, the coalition formation process and its final outcome 
need not be affected. That is, relative payoffs may affect the final allocation, but nevertheless be 
process neutral:  
  We can see this most clearly by analyzing the Treatment 3 game.
6 Suppose, for example, 
bargainers have ERC social preferences (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).
7 This means that 
bargainer i’s utility is of the form  (, ) ii i uxσ , where  i x  is the monetary payoff i receives and  i σ  is 
the proportion of the sum payout to all bargainers that i receives. As  i x  increases, holding  i σ  
fixed,  i u  increases. The social reference point for the 3-person game is 1/3 of the pie (we will see 
in a moment that this fits well with our data). Holding  i x  fixed,  i u  increases as  i σ  increases to 
1/3 and then decreases as  i σ  increases beyond 1/3. 
  For the moment, suppose that the builder, bargainer A, incurs a negligible loss of utility 
when  A σ  > 1/3; that is, A does not like to be treated unfairly but does not mind (much) to treat 
others unfairly. This sort of asymmetry assumption has proven to be a good approximation for 
bilateral bargaining behavior (Bolton, 1991; De Bruyn and Bolton, 2006). The subgame perfect 
equilibrium for the Treatment 3 game is derived by applying the same procedure as for the 
                                                 
6 For Treatments 1 and 2, the relative payoff equilibrium path is somewhat less precise.  The game in treatment 3 
suffices to make our point.    10
narrowly self-interested preferences. We first look for the threat coalition: In the second round, 
the best safe offer A can make is to propose AB with split 35-21. This offer should not be turned 
down by B since 21 is 1/3 of the pie of 63 (recall C’s externality payment is 7), and u(21, 1/3) > 
u(14, 1/3) for all ERC players. The best safe offers of ABC or AC give A a smaller payoff, and so 
are dominated by the AB proposal, making the latter the threat coalition. The reader can verify 
that, generally, AB is the threat coalition independent of A’s risk posture since any feasible offer 
of another coalition is dominated by a feasible AB coalition in terms of both A’s payoff and the 
probability that the offer is rejected. (Of course, less risk averse builders may choose a more 
aggressive offer than the safe one, a point we will return to below.) 
  Then the equilibrium offer in the first round has A proposing AC with a split of 30-8. C 
should accept, since rejection leads to the threat coalition and  C u (8,8/66) >  C u (7,7/63) for all 
ERC players. Observe that this is the exact same first stage proposal implied by the absolute 
payoff version of the equilibrium. 
  Then, in the second round, A proposes ABC with a split of 43-15-8. B should accept in the 
second round since  B u (15,15/66) >  B u (11,11/63) for all ERC players. So the equilibrium 
outcome is 43-15-8. Relative payoffs are process neutral in that the sequence of negotiations and 
the final coalition are the same as described in Table 1; but the payoffs are a bit compressed.  
  By this equilibrium, the game ends efficiently. Yet, this equilibrium does not compare 
well with the data. From Table 3, only 27% of the games in T3 end with the grand coalition, and 
among these, none form via AC in the first step.  
  There are other ERC-equilibrium paths for Treatment 3, but none square well with the 
data. Some involve A making offers that risk rejection. But all of these involve A proposing AC 
in the first stage. In the next section (3.3), we will see that AC is virtually never proposed. All the 
other alternative equilibria involve relaxing the assumption that bargainer A cares little about 
fairness towards others. But we will see in the next section that A’s actual proposals are well 
explained as optimal, self interested response to the other bargainers’ actual accept/reject 
behavior. So, while the compression of the payoff data is indicative of a role for relative payoff, 
there is something going beyond standard relative payoff theory explanations. 
                                                 
7 Other social preference formulations probably lead to a similar analysis.  11
3.3  The coalition formation process and the role of relative payoffs 
  Turning back to the data, we will see that once their role is properly understood, relative 
payoffs do explain a great deal of what we see here. To begin, however, observe from Table 3 
that not only the outcome, but also the process of coalition formation typically differs from that 
anticipated by the theory (both pure absolute and relative payoff theory); most coalitions form in 
one step even where the theory anticipates two. 
Table 3.  Frequencies of process of grand coalition formation * 
Treatment  ABC (1 step)      stage 1/stage 2  AB → ABC  AC → ABC 
T1      27 (45%)                 5/12  4 (7%)  0 (0%) 
T2      23 (38%)                19/4  11 (18%)  1 (2%) 
T3      15 (25%)                10/5  1 (2%)  0 (0%) 
Total      65 (36%)                44/21  16 (9%)  1 (1%) 
* Final coalitions consistent with equilibrium are in boldface. 
 
  Figure 2 provides a comparison of observed stage 1 proposals with theory. Observe that 
in all treatments the vast majority of players A propose to form either a coalition with player B 
alone or a coalition with both players B and C. While in T1 and T2 the number of proposals of 
AB and the number of proposals of ABC are about the same, in T3 proposals of AB are more 
prevalent than proposals of ABC by about a 3-to-1 ratio.  
 

















AB AC ABC no coalition predicted
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  Recall from Table 1 that the manipulation that distinguishes T1 from T2 is the externality 
payoff that goes to a player left out of a coalition. This manipulation appears to have little impact 
on coalitions proposed in stage 1; in particular, the manipulation does not meaningfully move 
stage 1 proposals towards more AB. In contrast, the manipulation that distinguishes T3, the 
higher payoff that goes to coalition AB has a clear impact on the coalition proposed; but the 
observed movement is towards more AB not towards AC as the theory predicts.  
 











  Why is there a persistent attraction to proposing AB and ABC in T1 and T2? Second, why 
does the attraction to proposing AB grow for T3? Towards answering this, first observe that the 
relative payoffs players A propose in stage 1 are revealing (see Figure 3; given the very small 
number of proposals for AC and for No Coalition, we focus only on proposals for AB and for 
ABC). Observe the consistent first mover advantage for both ABC and AB coalitions.
8 Also 
observe, for proposals of ABC, that the average relative payoff offered to player B is not 
particularly different from the average relative payoff offered to player C (p > 0.100 for all 
rounds in all three treatments). Most importantly, there is a good deal of consistency in relative 
payoffs across treatments. Comparing each coalition members’ relative payoff between all three  
                                                 
8 That is, for all coalitions and treatments, the relative payoff for the first mover was higher than the equal split, 
while the payoff for the other coalition members was lower (coalition AB: player A/B: p < 0.050 for 10 comparisons, 
p < 0.100 for 5 comp.; coalition ABC: player A: p < 0.050 for 4 comp., p < 0.100 for 2 comp., player B: p < 0.050 
for 2 comp., p < 0.100 for 4 comp., player C: p < 0.050 for 4 comp., p < 0.100 for 3 comp., two-tailed one-sample t-
test). Note that we found no significant results for coalition ABC in treatment T3. This might be due to the fact that, 
in this case, the number of observations was very low.  13
treatments we find significant differences neither for coalition AB (p > 0.100 for all rounds and 
treatment comparisons) nor for coalition ABC (p > 0.100 for all players, rounds, and treatment 
comparisons, except 1 comparison where p < 0.100).  
  Observe from Figure 3 that the average relative payoffs for proposals of ABC 
approximate a 40-30-30 split; for AB they approximate a 60-40 split. The tendency towards these 
values is well explained by what the responders to the proposal are willing to accept and reject, 
as displayed in Figure 4. There are almost no significant differences between treatments with 
regard to the average payoffs that were accepted and rejected by the proposed-to coalition 
members (p > 0.100 for all treatment comparisons, coalition members, and coalitions in all 5 
rounds, except 1 comparison, in which p < 0.05, two-tailed exact Mann-Whitney-U test). 
Moreover, we observe no significant differences regarding the accepted and rejected amounts 
between player B and C in coalition ABC (p > 0.100 for all 3 treatments in all 5 rounds, two-
tailed exact Mann-Whitney-U test). 
 







ABC_T1 ABC_T2 ABC_T3 AB_T1 AB_T2 AB_T3
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  It is important to note the critical difference between the responder behavior we observe 
and that anticipated by the standard theory of relative payoffs. Following on the analysis in 
section 3.2: Observe from Figure 4 that the amount of a grand coalition that C players accept on 
average in Treatment 3 is about 30% of the grand coalition payoff – even though this is more 
than twice, in both absolute and relative terms, what they would receive if the threat coalition AB  14
forms in stage 2.
9 Hence responding bargainers appear to evaluate relative payoffs myopically. 
That is, they appear to be responding to offers as if this is the final coalition decision, ignoring 
the consequences and (relative) payoffs that might result from stage 2 activity. We will come 
back to the potential reasons for this in the summary section; for the moment, we simply accept 
the empirical fact and follow its consequences. 
  Given the facts represented in Figures 3 and 4, we can understand why players A favor 
proposals of AB and why AB proposals increase in T3. Specifically, a successful grand coalition 
proposal pays A an average of 0.4 x $66 = $26.4. For T1 and T2, a successful AB coalition pays 
0.6 x $46 = $27.6, and in T3, it pays 0.6 x $56 = $33.6. In contrast (supposing an average 40% 
offer is necessary for success here as well), proposing AC would pay 0.6 x $38 = $22.8.  
  There is nevertheless a good number of builders in T1 and T2 who propose the grand 
coalition in stage 1, even though their own payoff goes down on average about $1. These 
proposers are plausibly opting to sacrifice the $1 to purchase greater equity. It is also possible 
that the difference in expected payoff is not salient to them. Either way, this observation also 
implies an explanation for why, in T3, the balance tips decisively away from proposing grand 
coalitions to proposals of AB: In T3, the average payoff that resulted from forming coalition ABC 
was $5 lower than the average payoff that resulted from forming coalition AB; hence greater 
equity is more expensive to purchase, and the purchase price is more difficult to miss.  
  By the argument in the last paragraph, we might have expected more ABC coalitions in 
T2, in which the non-member C’s payoff was only $7, than in T1, in which the non-member C’s 
payoff was $17. But we do not observe such pattern in stage 1. However, as Figure 5 illustrates, 
at the second stage 56 percent of players A wanted to enlarge coalition AB in T2, while only 42 
percent wanted to do so in T1. Unfortunately, the number of observations per round is quite low, 
making it difficult to support this interpretation of the data with significant results (i.e., for all 




                                                 
9 In fact, there is no player C in Treatment 3, who accepts less than about 20% of the grand coalition payoff even 
though this is twice, in both absolute and relative terms, what this player would receive if the threat coalition AB 
forms in stage 2.  15













T1 - AB T2 - AB T3 - AB
stay with AB enlarge to ABC
 
  
  In T3 the number of players A, who attempted to enlarge coalition AB, was extremely 
low, though in this treatment player C’s payoff as a non-member was the same as in T2, i.e. only 
$7. This observation might be explained by the fact that the total payoff for coalition AB and 
player C was already $63 ($56 + $7) and, consequently, the maximum additional payoff player A 
could offer player C in order to enlarge the coalition was only $3. As a consequence, player C’s 
final payoff as a coalition member would be significantly lower than the final payoff for 
coalition member B.
10 Our observations regarding the average payoffs that were offered to player 
C in T1 and T2 suggests that, in fact, players A geared to the payoff for player B when making an 
offer to player C.  
 
                                                 
10 Note that the maximum additional payoff player A could offer player C in order to enlarge the coalition was $3 
also in treatment T1. However, proposing this amount to player C in treatment T1 would result in a final payoff of 
$20 – an amount that is very similar to the final payoff for player B.  16




















 Analyzing  player  Cs’ responses seems to justify this strategy. In T1 and T2 only 25 
percent of players C rejected player As’ proposal, while in T3 the frequency of rejections was 75 
percent. Investigating the average payoffs that were accepted and rejected by players C seems to 
further support this interpretation (see Figure 7). In particular, players C always accepted a 
payoff that was similar to the payoff proposed to player B. The findings indicate that, in 
treatment T3, players A anticipated the high number of rejections and, therefore, abstained from 
proposing an enlargement of the coalition.
11 
 















T1 - enlarge AB T2 - enlarge AB T3 - enlarge AB
payoff proposed to B C_accepted C_rejected
 
 
                                                 
11 Possibly, players A did not want to be faced with an almost sure rejection by players C and, therefore, did not want 
to give players C an opportunity to show their displeasure. Or perhaps they felt that what they had to offer would be 
treated as insulting and so refrained for this reason.  17
As a result, at the end of the coalition games the majority of players A formed a coalition with 
player B and player C in treatments T1 and T2, while in treatment T3 the majority of players A 
formed a coalition only with player B. The final outcomes are illustrated in Figure 8. 
 


















AB AC ABC no coalition
 
 
4  The game with communication 
 
  Section 3 demonstrates that once we understand the myopic nature of relative payoff 
considerations, most of the deviations from theory (whether the theory assumes purely absolute 
or admits relative payoff motives) fall into line. Perhaps most importantly, we can understand 
why the final outcome is often inefficient. Then what accounts for the myopia? The obvious 
explanation is that bargainers considering stage 1 proposals have trouble looking forward to 
stage 2 and reasoning back, which violates the backward induction assumption. There is 
evidence for a failure to backward induct in bilateral sequential bargaining games (Johnson, 
Camerer, Sen, and Rymon, 2002), although bargaining theory that assumes relative payoffs and 
backward induction nevertheless approximate much of what we observe in these games (Bolton, 
1991; De Bruyn and Bolton, 2006). Still, two stage coalition bargaining is more complex, with 
more bargainers and larger strategy spaces (the builder must choose who to propose to as well as 
what to propose). Taking this greater complexity into account while backward inducting might 
well heighten the disconnect between theory and data. Indeed, incorporating relative payoffs into 
preferences makes the game one of incomplete information, and the greater complexity makes it 
all the harder to anticipate the future actions of other bargainers. Even if bargainers were quite 
good at backward induction, the greater strategic uncertainty would lead them to weight the stage  18
1 outcomes more heavily than potential stage 2 formations (since the uncertainty opens up the 
possibility that there will be no further coalition formation in stage 2). 
  One way to mitigate any backward induction problem, and perhaps any difficulties with 
strategic uncertainty, would be to allow (cheap talk) communication between bargainers prior to 
each stage of play. This would allow the builder to communicate his plans ahead of time and get 
feedback from the other bargainers before committing to that plan.  
  To test the influence of communication, we ran treatments T1_C and T3_C allowing 
bargainers to communicate prior to the issuing of proposals and responses. Figures 9 and 10 
summarize the data.  
 






















T1 T1_C T3 T3_C
AB AC ABC no coal
 
 
  There are three principle observations to make. First, communication improves 
efficiency, although unevenly. Efficiency increases in both treatments because there are no AC or 
No Coalition outcomes. There is also growth in the frequency of grand coalitions at the expense 
of  AB coalitions. On this last point, however, the two treatments differ with respect to the 
magnitude of change: Grand coalition outcomes grow greatly from T1 to T1_C (52% to 90%, p 
< 0.050 for 2 rounds, p < 0.100 for 1 round, p > 0.100 for 2 rounds), but less so from T3 to T3_C 
(27% to 49%, p > 0.100 for all rounds, two-tailed χ
2 test). The AB coalition is still the majority 
end coalition in T3_C (51%).  
  The second observation, not shown in the figures, is that communication changes the 
process of coalition building barely at all. For example, in T1_C, 23 of the 27 grand coalitions 
form in one, while in T1, 28 of 31 grand coalitions form in one step. (Numbers for T3 and T3_C  19
are similar.) 
  Third, in Figure 10 we see that communication compresses differences in player payoffs. 
In particular, in treatment 1 players C and in treatment 3 players B significantly profited from 
communication (C in T1: p < 0.050 for 4 rounds, B in T3: p < 0.05 for 1 round, p < 0.100 for 1 
round; p > 0.100 for all other comparisons, two-tailed exact Mann-Whitney-U test). The ordering 
of the average payoffs across roles however, remains the same. Though, only in treatment 3 and 
only with regard to players C we observe a significant first mover advantage after 
communication (A vs. C in T3_C: p < 0.050 for 5 rounds; p > 0.100 for all other comparisons).  
 















  To summarize, communication helps foster efficiency some but does not fully eliminate 
the inefficiencies we see, particularly in T3_C. It has virtually no influence on the pattern of 
coalition formation. 
5  Summary 
  The most striking finding from our study is how challenging it turns out to be to build a 
grand coalition. Returning to Table 2, the overall rate of efficient, grand coalition formation is 
less than 50%. Analyzing the data for the underlying reasons reveals that the coalition formation 
process is not particularly consistent with the predicted equilibrium paths – regardless of whether 
we do the analysis with relative payoffs included or with absolute payoffs only. Most coalitions 
form in one step where the theory anticipates two and, irrespective of the payoff variation, the 
vast majority of coalition builders form a coalition either with player B alone or with both 
players B and C. The main difference between treatments is regarding the frequency of AB and  20
ABC coalitions: In treatments T1 and T2 (where the grand coalition yields the highest per capita 
payoff) ABC is the most frequent coalition outcome, in T3 (where AB yields the highest per 
capita payoff) it is AB.  
  Unsurprisingly, relative payoffs clearly matter in these games. This is most clear from 
Figure 4, which shows a strong correlation between relative payoffs and rejection behavior 
across treatments, even though the absolute payoff consequences of this behavior vary a good 
deal. Nevertheless, we observe the highest inefficiency in Treatment 3 (Table 3), where relative 
and absolute payoffs are aligned such that the equilibrium path and payoffs are essentially the 
same regardless of whether relative payoffs are taken into account. The inflexibility of rejection 
rates observed in Figure 4, along with other evidence, suggests that relative payoff calculations 
are being applied with greater myopia than theory suggests. 
  The communication we allowed in a second set of treatments, though it was cheap talk, 
increased efficiency: For Treatment 1 games efficiency rose from 52% to 90% and for Treatment 
3 from 27% to 49% (Figure 9). It appears that communication is a crucial factor in successful 
coalition building.  
  An important limitation of the present study is that we examined only one 
communication network, one in which bargainers must all communicate publicly with one 
another. This may well explain why communication compresses payoffs in our study, and, in 
particular, why coalition builders do more poorly even as overall surplus rises. It would be useful 
to study other communication networks to see what influence this might have on coalition 
building behavior. Other studies, conducted on less controlled conditions than those studied here 
find a large communication effect (see references in section I). It would be beneficial to 
reproduce these effects in the more controlled non-cooperative game environment to better 
understand precisely what effect communication has, and how different communication systems 
might influence the ultimatum success or failure of coalition building.  21
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Appendix.  Below is a sample of the written instructions given to subjects for Treatment 1.  Treatments 2 and 3 
differed only in the stated payoffs.  Additional instructions for the communication treatments appear in brackets.   
 
General.  Please read the instructions carefully.  If at any time you have questions or problems, raise your hand and 
the monitor will be happy to assist you.  From now until the end of the session, unauthorized communication of any 
nature with other participants is prohibited. 
 
During the session, you will engage in a series of negotiations, carried out over the computer with other participants.  
Each negotiation gives you an opportunity to earn cash.  
 
Description of the Negotiation.  Each negotiation involves three participants labeled “Player A”, “Player B”, and 
“Player C”.  Player A can propose either to form a coalition with Player B, or to form a coalition with Player C, or to 
form a coalition with both B and C, or to form no coalition.  Each possible coalition results in a certain earning for 
the coalition as a whole, as well as a certain earning for any player who is not in the coalition.  The following 





 total of 
Each non-member 
earns 
[A and B] $45.00 $17.00 
[A and C] $37.00 $21.00 
[A, B, and C] $66.00  – 
No Coalition  –  $14.00 
 
The game begins with No Coalition.  In order to form a coalition, the members must negotiate and agree upon a split 
of the coalition earnings.  The negotiation proceeds in two stages: 
Stage 1.  Player A proposes a coalition and a split of the coalition’s earnings among the coalition members.  
Then, each proposed member is asked to either accept or reject the proposal.  If all accept, then the 
coalition forms and the accepting members exit the negotiation with the earnings they accepted.  If any 
rejects, then there is No Coalition.   
If the coalition between all three players, [A, B, and C], forms, then the negotiation ends. Otherwise, Stage 
2 of the negotiation begins. 
Stage 2.  Player A either proposes to enlarge the coalition that formed in Stage 1, or keep it as it is.  If he 
proposes to enlarge the coalition, he also proposes a split of the earnings between himself and the new 
members.  The earnings of a member who already formed a coalition with Player A in Stage 1 cannot 
change.  Each new proposed member is asked to either accept or reject the proposal.  If all accept, then the 
coalition forms and all players exit the negotiation with the earnings they accepted.  If any rejects, then all 
players exit with the coalition and split determined by Stage 1. 
 
[In the communication version, the following paragraph began both the stage 1 and stage 2 description: 
Players A, B, and C enter a shared chat room through the “In Touch” tab on their Angel screen.  After 
entry, the players have 3 minutes to negotiate with each other in the chat room regarding forming 
coalitions and striking deals.  Upon conclusion of the 3 minutes, stage two follows on the other active 
monitor screen.] 
 
All negotiations are conducted by computer.  Instructions on how to operate the computer program will be provided 
after everyone has finished reading the instructions. 
 
Player Roles.  Your role, A, B, or C, will be randomly determined prior to negotiating. You will keep the same role 
for all games; ex., if you are a Player A in the first game, you will be a player A for all games. 
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Information: In each stage of the negotiations the three players are informed about Player A’s proposal, about the 
acceptance or rejection of the proposal by each proposed member, and about any coalition that formed.  There is 
also a box on the computer screen that provides you with a history of the past negotiations you participated in.  At 
all times, an onscreen calculator is available to assist with your decisions.  To use it, click the calculator icon.  
Scratch paper and a pen have also been provided for you. 
 
Grouping Procedure. In each negotiation you are matched with different participants.  You will never negotiate with 
the same person more than once.   
 
During the negotiation, you will be referred to by your role: either Player A, B or C.  Participants’ identities are 
strictly confidential and will not be revealed either before, during or after the session.   
 
Your earnings: You will negotiate more than once.  You will actually be paid for just one negotiation.  The paid 
negotiation will be selected by a lottery after all the negotiations have been completed.  Each negotiation has an 
equal chance of being selected, so it is in your interest to make the most money you can in each and every 
negotiation.  Immediately upon conclusion of the session, you will be paid your earnings plus a $5 show-up fee, in 
cash. 
 
Consent Forms.  If you wish to participate in this study, please read and sign the accompanying consent form. 
 
Practice Games.  After consent forms have been collected, and prior to playing the real games, we will play some 
practice games.  Use the practice games to become accustomed to how the game is played and to how actions are 
entered into the computer.  The practice games differ from the actual games in three ways.  First, no money will be 
paid for the practice games.  The purpose of the practice games is to give you experience with the game rules and 
the computer interface.  Second, you will play each practice game from a different point of view, permitting you to 
experience the game from each player role: A, B, and C.  Third, the computer will be your partner for the practice 
games and its actions will be generated at random (so do not worry if the actions do not make sense to you).   
 
 